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Dr Bridgette Toy-Cronin, University of Otago Legal Issues Centre 
 
We need more legal aid! We need more pro bono! These are the common responses by lawyers 
when asked about how to increase access to civil justice. However, government provided legal 
assistance and donated legal assistance cannot be a complete cure to what ails our system when 
we are not simply trying to find access for a few, but for the many – almost all individuals and 
small businesses are priced out of the legal services market (Kayla Stewart and Bridgette Toy-
Cronin The New Zealand Legal Services Mapping Project: Finding Free and Low-Cost Legal 
Services Pilot Report (University of Otago Legal Issues Centre, 2018). Part of the response 
must also be changing the price of legal services so people can afford to access them.  
 
In this article, I examine the explanations and possible cures for the high prices of civil 
litigation services. I take this focus on civil litigation both because this is the primary interest 
of the University of Otago Legal Issues Centre, which I direct, but also because the pricing of 
legal services is highly complex and there are different forces at work in different parts of the 
market. It is not therefore possible to cover all the terrain and so I concentrate on legal services 
for litigation, an area of considerable concern given it is often regarded as uneconomical to 
instruct a lawyer for any claim worth less than $100,000.  
 
The article considers the explanations and suggestions for change in the international literature 
and applies them to the New Zealand context. The purpose is to encourage reflection on the 
pricing of legal services as part of the answer to access to justice. It is also to encourage a future 
focus where we move to action. By setting out what is already known and identifying fruitful 
areas of future inquiry, we can concentrate our efforts on possible solutions and avoid going 
over fallow ground. I begin by summarising the explanations for why civil litigation services 
are expensive before turning to the suggestions about what changes might bring prices down. 
 
THE EXPLANATIONS  
Lawyers are greedy 
That lawyers are greedy is an explanation for the pricing of legal services that arises from  
“conventional popular culture”: “lawyers are an avaricious lot who will bleed you dry” (Gillian 
Hadfield "The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts the Justice System" (2000) 
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98(4) Michigan Law Review 953 at 954). While not quite in these terms, the former Chief 
Justice, Elias CJ, often referred to legal services being expensive because lawyers may have 
“expectations of higher income levels than may be sustainable” and that “people are trapped 
by the unrealistic incomes in legal practice today” ((Sian Elias "Address Given to the 
Canterbury Law School" (8 August 2013) and “Towards Justice: Reflections on the system and 
society” (2018 Sir John Graham Lecture, the Heritage, Auckland, 10 August 2018)). That 
lawyers are greedy – or at least have inflated expectations for income – accords with Lerman’s 
argument that “a free-market economy tends to cultivate and reinforce impulses toward greed” 
in all sectors, including law (Lisa Lerman "Greed among American Lawyers" (2005) 30 
Oklahoma City University Law Review 611 at 636).  
 
Training is expensive 
Another common explanation, usually raised by American commentators, is that training is 
expensive: Many young lawyers “work in the shadow of heavy debt loads, generated by 
education at both undergraduate and professional schools” (Dennis Curtis and Judith Resnik 
"Teaching Billing: Metrics of Value in Law Firms and Law Schools" (2002) 54(6) Stanford 
Law Review 1409). Law is complex and therefore significant training is required before the 
trainees can practice. The training requirements create pressure for higher wages to compensate 
new entrants to the market for the expense they incurred. This is compounded by growing 
student debt. There is a considerable literature on the burden of student debt for American law 
graduates and how this has correlated with a rise in starting salaries (Robert W Hillman "The 
Hidden Costs of Lawyer Mobility: Of Law Firms, Law Schools, and the Education of Lawyers" 
(2002) 91 Kentucky Law Journal 299. See also John A. Sebert "The Cost and Financing of 
Legal Education Out-of-the-Box Dialogs" (2002) 52 Journal of Legal Education 516). These 
findings do not necessarily translate to New Zealand where debt burdens are generally much 
lower but it may provide some explanation given the debt has grown significantly since the 
introduction of fees in the mid-1990s (for example, see Ministry of Education Student Loan 
Scheme Annual Report 2017/18 (November 2018)), and the decreasing affordability of tertiary 
education since 2003 (Ministry of Education Affordability of Tertiary Education (December 
2018)). Student debt has also been shown to make graduates less willing to start to their own 
businesses, meaning students are reliant on jobs with incumbent players, rather than creating 
competition (Karthik Krishnan and Pinshuo Wang "The Cost of Financing Education: Can 
Student Debt Hinder Entrepreneurship?" (2018)  Management Science 1-33). 
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Asymmetry of information 
Litigation services are what economists call “credence goods”. The buyers of the service are 
unable to assess their need for the service and, if they purchase the service, they are also unable 
to assess the quality of that service (Duncan Webb "Killing Time: A Limited Defence of Time-
Cost Billing" (2010) 13 Legal Ethics 39 at 54). Indeed, law is so complex – so sensitive to 
difference and detail – that “the necessity and quality of legal services are not merely difficult 
for nonexperts to judge; they are also difficult for experts, even the expert providing the service, 
to judge” (Hadfield at 970). 
 
Unable to judge the quality and necessity of services offered, clients look towards proxies to 
guide their purchasing decisions. One of the proxies is price per hour: “Consequently clients 
tend to avoid low cost legal services and to presume that higher cost lawyers are better. 
Expensive lawyers may also be sought out by clients who can afford them as a signal to others 
about the status of the client” (Webb at 38). There are a range of other possible proxies: firm 
branding, the appearance of the lawyers’ premises, membership of sub-specialty groups (e.g. 
the Arbitrators and Mediators Institute of New Zealand), qualifications in excess of the 
statutory minimum (e.g. a Master of Laws degree), and “representation of high profile or 
wealthy clients, win/loss records, expensive art work, academic credentials, tough talk, 
punctuality, hours of work” (Hadfield at 971-972). The short point is that when clients rely on 
proxies, price is governed by “clients’ beliefs and willingness to pay, not by the cost of the 
service” (Hadfield at 972). This means the very nature of litigation services has an effect on 
pricing. 
 
The lack of information about quality is compounded by the lack of information about price: 
Information plays a direct role in driving competition, as consumers need to have 
access to accurate information on price, service and quality in order to make 
informed purchasing decisions. If the competitive process works well it can lead, 
for example, to lower prices, higher quality, and greater innovation. (Competition 
and Markets Authority Legal Services Market Study: Final Report (London, 2016)). 
Lawyers and firms very rarely advertise the price of their services on their websites or via any 
other kind of easy to access information. This makes it very difficult for prospective clients to 
understand the pricing and shop accordingly (although even if they did, price may still operate 
as a proxy for quality).   
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Monopoly and self-regulation 
“Conventional professional wisdom” is that prices are high because lawyers have a monopoly 
over the provision of legal services (Hadfield at 954). Monopolies are, by definition, anti-
competitive and prices are therefore high. The monopoly is justified on the basis that it protects 
consumers by regulating the providers of the services. This is particularly important, so the 
argument goes, because it is so hard to judge the quality of the actual service provided (as just 
discussed) so it must be the quality of the providers that is controlled. To control provider 
quality, qualifications must be put in place which “shields lawyers from price competition from 
other players in the market”, driving up prices. (Laurel Rigertas "The Legal Profession’s 
Monopoly: Failing to Protect Consumers" (2014) 82 Fordham Law Review 2683 at 2695). 
 
In addition to the profession’s control of the market having an effect on price, so too do 
autonomy and self-regulation. True self-regulation has mostly disappeared in the face of 
critique that self-regulation “could be a cloak for rent-seeking, for regulatory capture, 
ineffective disciplinary procedures and anti-competitive practices” (Alan Paterson Lawyers 
and the Public Good: Democracy in Action? (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012) 
at 29 citing various studies). New Zealand, like many other jurisdictions, now has co-regulation 
but this still leaves a large degree of autonomy for the profession in monitoring and disciplining 
violations of charging regulations. Both monopoly and autonomy may therefore be part of the 
explanation. 
 
Nature of litigation 
The nature of litigation – where there is considerable time investment up front in getting to 
know the client and their problem and devising a strategy – means that there are considerable 
sunk costs. This is, as Hadfield says, is a “source of market power for lawyers” and one open 
to exploitation, as clients are unlikely to change lawyers once a matter has begun (Hadfield at 
977). These sunk costs can also be beneficial to lawyers as clients may take them into account 
when making decisions about whether to continue the litigation (and therefore keep paying the 
lawyer) or settle the litigation. In theory, sunk costs should not effect this decision as they 
cannot be recovered and do not impact on future chances – as economists say “sunk costs are 
sunk”. However, clients do take them into account and decide to continue litigating rather than 
take a modest settlement (Webb at 56). 
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Another factor at play in litigation is what economists call the “tournament effect”. Litigation 
is often characterised by “winner takes all” so it is rational to pay for the best lawyer the litigant 
can afford (even though who is the best is hard to judge). Webb explains this effect in the 
context of a complex competition law case involving large businesses where millions of dollars 
are at stake: 
If there are two lawyers in the field and one is considered to be almost but not quite 
as good as the other, how much more would it be rational for the company to pay 
to secure the very best lawyer? The answer is a great deal indeed. If the second best 
lawyer charges $600 per hour, the company may well be prepared to pay double or 
triple that amount for the very best lawyer. Such a decision is made on the basis that 
the increase is small compared with the amount at stake and they wish to eliminate 
the risk of losing the case due to a lack of expertise. This results in a 
disproportionately high premium on that small increase in expertise. (Webb at 56) 
The premium expert lawyers can request is exaggerated because a small increase in legal skill 
can result in litigation win. Paying for second-best lawyer is not the client’s preference, even 
if substantially cheaper, because of the “winner takes all” outcome. As the reputation will often 
attach to the firm rather than the individual lawyer, “firms will emerge as tournament winners”, 
allowing the firm to grow in size and dominance in the market (Hadfield at 975). Again, this 
is a pricing explanation which goes to the very structure of the service being purchased.  
 
The structure of firms and billable hours 
The structure of the firms taking part in the “tournament” is also a factor in pricing. They 
usually price using hourly rates and are organised like a triangle: at the base of the triangle are 
the larger numbers of junior lawyers, and at the apex, smaller numbers of partners. All the 
lawyers bill but employed lawyers are paid only a salary while the equity partnership shares 
the profit generated. This firm structure is sometimes pointed to as a reason for the high price 
of legal services as it encourages equity partners to increase hourly rates to increase their 
profits, particularly if the partnership is growing and there would otherwise be less to go around 
(Mark Cohen "Law’s Distribution and Price Problems" (May/June 2016) 42 Law Practice 51). 
 
Hourly billing also plays a role in the total amount charged to the client as it is not only a 
mechanism to charge clients but is used as a metric for lawyer performance within a firm – the 
more hours billed and recovered, the better the lawyers’ performance is regarded (Webb; 
Lawrence Fox "End Billable Hour Goals … Now" (2006) 17(3) The Professional Lawyer 1; 
Susan Saab Fortney "Soul for Sale: An Empirical Study of Associate Satisfaction, Law Firm 
Culture, and the Effects of Billable Hour Requirements" (2000) 69 University of Missouri 
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Kansas City Law Review 239; Christine Parker and Adrian Evans Inside Lawyers' Ethics 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007). This system is blamed for at least three 
effects that increase the amount charged to the client: 
First, lawyers who bill by the hour tend to perform as much work as possible for 
clients, with little analysis of whether that work is in fact likely to further the clients’ 
interests. Second, lawyers do not record their time contemporaneously or 
accurately, which results in clients paying for more time than was spent on their 
files. Finally, a material number of lawyers who bill by the hour are not honest in 
recording their time; instead, they either consciously or subconsciously inflate the 
number of hours they record, with the result that clients pay for hours which were 
never worked. (Alice Woolley "Time for Change: Unethical Hourly Billing in the 
Canadian Profession and What Should Be Done about It" (2004) 83 Canadian Bar 
Review 859 at 864).  
Hourly billing and the firm structure are therefore pointed to as another explanation for high 
prices.  
 
Structure of the market for dispute resolution advice and representation  
It is not only the structure of firms but also the structure of the profession as a whole that may 
explain pricing. Hadfield argues that having one market for both the commercial clients (who 
can draw on a larger aggregation of wealth) and individual clients,1 means that resources are 
pulled disproportionately into the commercial sphere and individuals are largely priced out 
(Hadfield at 956-957). This is because it results in a bidding competition between the two 
groups which the commercial clients “overwhelmingly win” and therefore: 
[T]he profession is propelled by market forces to devote itself disproportionately to 
the management of the economic relationships of commerce and not the 
management of just relations among individuals and the state. 
Furthermore, the market serving the individual clients is primarily made up of small firm and 
solo practitioners. These businesses are small scale and practice across a range of 
specialisations making them inefficient, which drives up cost and therefore prices. The costs 
that small operators must carry are many and varied including: 
… not only the time, research and educational costs incurred by an attorney in 
producing analysis or advice or representation, but also the cost to the attorney of 
operating a solo or small firm practice: renting space, hiring assistants, devising a 
pricing scheme, collecting bills, marketing services. It includes the cost to the 
consumer of recognising the need for and then finding, evaluating, understanding, 
and implementing the analysis and recommendation. And it includes the costs 
associated with risk, errors and waste in the provision of services. (Gillian Hadfield 
 
1 This is a crude division for simplicity. The commercial sphere will also serve high wealth individuals and 
lawyers acting primarily for individuals will also serve small corporate entities.  
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"The cost of law: Promoting access to justice through the (un)corporate practice of 
law" (2014) 38 International Review of Law and Economics 43 at 49). 
These features of the structure of the market operate as explanations for high prices across all 
areas of civil dispute resolution.  
 
Summary 
As this survey of the explanations for the price of litigation services shows, there are a variety 
of often interlinked theories on why prices remain high. Some go to the very core of the type 
of services offered and some may be more amendable to change. I now turn to the suggested 
responses. The purpose is not to make a final assessment of the utility of these suggestions but 
to broaden the scope of the discussion on access to justice so that more possibilities are put on 
the table. More research and thinking is needed on whether any or all of these might be effective 
in New Zealand but this is to the lay the ground work for further research and policy 
consideration. I summarise the suggestions as follows and make some initial comments on their 
application to New Zealand: the reduction or destruction of lawyers’ monopoly; changes to 
how we licence lawyers; creating scale for services for individuals; changes to charging 
practices; and indirect changes that may lower price (including to legal education, changes in 
civil procedure, and models of service delivery). 
 
SUGGESTED RESPONSES 
Reduction or destruction of lawyers’ monopoly 
Given monopoly power is a frequently cited reason for high prices in legal services, a common 
response is to say the monopoly should be reduced or destroyed to create competition and 
reduce prices. There are a number of different sources of monopoly power that have to be 
considered if this is to be a response.  
 
The most commonly perceived form of monopoly is that over the provision of legal services. 
The argument is that if lawyers were exposed to competition from other professionals, then 
prices will fall. While perhaps not widely understood by the public, the monopoly lawyers have 
over the provision of civil dispute legal services in New Zealand is limited. The regulation of 
lawyers was significantly amended in 2006 and those regulations included “a conscious intent 
to open traditional areas of lawyers’ work up to competition, and to provide consumers with 
greater choice” (Selene Mize "New Zealand: Finding the Balance between Self-Regulation and 
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Government Oversight" in A Boon (ed) International Perspectives on the Regulation of 
Lawyers (2017) at 134). While there is a general rule that appearing before a court or tribunal 
and providing advice in relation to proceedings is an area of work reserved for lawyers, there 
are many exceptions to this rule. Unregulated non-lawyer advocates are permitted to appear in 
the Employment Court and Employment Relations Authority as well a number of other areas: 
“environment/resource management, accident compensation, arbitration, immigration, 
copyright, human rights, social security and taxation” (Mize at 134). Unpaid non-lawyer 
advocates can also appear in the District Court in specific circumstances. Lawyers in New 
Zealand do not, therefore, have a monopoly over litigation in all settings in New Zealand, with 
competition from non-lawyers being permitted. It is, however, unclear the extent to which this 
competition has in fact developed and how well the public understands the availability and 
nature of the different services.  
 
Lawyers do, however, possess a competitive advantage, as Webb points out:  
Lawyers have advantages over other providers of legal services such as employment 
advocates, immigration advisers and accountants, in that they have an imprimatur 
of the state, by virtue of admission, of minimum quality standards in terms of the 
provision of legal advice (Webb at 58).  
It may be possible to provide some imprimatur of the state by regulating non-lawyer providers 
and therefore increasing genuine competition. It is questionable whether competition from non-
regulated, non-lawyers has created a reduction in prices for the consumer: “Non-lawyers 
seldom advertise cheaper costs as a reason for using their services, and many indicate that their 
fees are roughly comparable to legal fees. Some non-lawyers charge more than a lawyer would” 
(Mize at 135). Licencing non-lawyers to provide certain aspects of legal practice as a lower 
cost alternative may help. New Zealand already has some licencing of para-professionals to 
perform legal services, for example the conveyancing profession. Consideration could however 
be given to licencing of specialists to assist in litigation. In Washington State in the United 
States there are Limited Licence Legal Technicians (LLLTs) who were created to assist in 
family law and some commentators support the expansion of such programmes (Rigertas at 
2693).  
 
Lawyers do, however, have a key relationship to the state’s monopoly on coercion. While not 
holding a true monopoly, they are still a key interface between the citizen and the courts: “The 
market power that lawyers ultimately possess … is that the system to which they hold the keys 
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exercises the only legitimate coercive power in society” (Hadfield at 996-997). Their power 
draws on the state’s monopoly over coercive dispute resolution; it is the coercive power of the 
state that establishes the value of legal services as there are no alternatives to create a market 
for the legal system itself (Hadfield at 996-997). Altering this relationship however introduces 
“monumental questions and truly daunting” reform (Hadfield at 1004). 
 
Changes to licencing of lawyers  
The legal profession’s ability to determine the qualifications for becoming a lawyer is also 
cited as a monopoly power. The profession does not have sole control over this (the government 
also regulates) but it does have a major voice. While these are barriers to entry – admission to 
university, completion of an approved degree, completion of admission requirements – anyone 
who meets these requirements can enter and compete. There are natural barriers to entry as 
Hadfield points out including the need for experience (much of it very specific to the 
subspecialty and location of practice) and cognitive aptitude for law which limits the available 
pool of practitioners (Hadfield 996-997). There are also financial barriers to meeting these 
entry requirements. There are however a high numbers of graduates, meaning there are plenty 
of new entrants, making it difficult to see change in this area as the answer.   
 
More creative alternatives are changing how we licence those who meet the requirements to 
force specialisation and therefore create separate markets where the commercial clients could 
not exercise so much pull on the pricing. This reform could occur at the law school level where 
students could select either a degree specialising in services for either commercial clients or 
personal clients (Hadfield at 1004-1005). Alternatively, the separate licencing could occur later 
in training. Paterson has commented that it is surprising that the legal profession has not 
followed developments in the medical profession and moved to formal licencing of sub-
specialties (Paterson at 33). For example, to qualify as a general medical practitioner in New 
Zealand, trainees join the General Practice Education Programme after their basic medical 
training and become members of the Royal New Zealand College of General Practitioners once 
qualified. All other medical specialities have the same structure. Law could imitate this creating 
separate markets for different types of legal services.  
 
Creating scale in services for individuals 
To reduce the cost of providing personal plight services to clients and therefore create 
opportunity for prices to be lowered, some commentators suggest more scale needs to be 
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created in services for individuals. This could be achieved through branding or franchising 
providers of services for individuals to “different segments of the market broken down both by 
income and circumstances” e.g. small business operators with employment issues or middle 
income individuals with relationship property disputes (Hadfield (2014) at 53). There have 
been some examples of attempts to achieve this in New Zealand, although it may be that 
regulatory change could allow business structures that support this model to arise (Hadfield 
(2014)).  
 
Change charging practices 
Alternatives to time-based billing 
In response to the pricing pressures created by the billable hour, a range of alternatives have 
been suggested, and many are already practiced but are not the dominate form of charging (e.g. 
value based, contingent, fixed fee). This does not mean completely eliminating the billable 
hour which may be the fairest way of charging in some circumstances, but introducing a greater 
suite of acceptable forms of charging. Webb suggests that there is “no unified solution” for 
billing and there is a general tension between the lawyer and client: “it is in the interests of the 
lawyer to adopt a charging practice which maximises the overall amount of income, and in the 
interests of any particular client to pay as little as possible for the best quality of service 
possible” (Webb at 39). The adoption of a more diverse range of billing practices, matched to 
particular situations, offers potential solutions the price of legal services (Webb at 41; Parker 
and Evans, above n at 204-205; New Zealand Bar Association Working Group on Access to 
Justice Access to Justice: Āhei ki te Ture (New Zealand Bar Association, 2018)).  
 
Transparency in pricing 
More transparency in pricing has also been suggested as a means of creating more competition 
and therefore lowering prices for the client. Lawyers are obliged to tell clients in the letter of 
engagement the basis on which they will be charged, to provide an estimate, and “to inform 
the client promptly if it becomes apparent that fee estimate is likely to be exceeded” (Lawyers 
and Conveyances Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care Rules), Rules 3.4 and 9.4.). This 
could be strengthened, for example using regulations such as in the telecommunications 
industry to prevent “bill shock” where lawyers are required to notify the client if the monthly 
bill is likely to exceed a pre-determined amount.  
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The existing rules do not ensure that pricing information is transparent to the consumer who is 
searching for legal representation as they only create obligations at the point of engagement. 
By this time the client has usually spent time speaking to the lawyer and begun building the 
relationship (creating sunk costs early in the matter). In its review of the legal services market 
in the United Kingdom, the Competition and Market Authority said that for pricing to be 
transparent it needs to be accessible in that it should be easy to find and available before 
approaching a provider, so comparisons can be made at the “search stage, rather than at the 
point of engagement” (Competition and Market Authority at [3.65]-[3.68]). This would mean 
regulatory reform to require public disclosure of pricing schedules (at least the “rack rates”) in 
publicly accessible forms, for example on the lawyer’s website.  
 
Regulation of charging 
Stronger monitoring of charging abuses has been identified as another avenue for controlling 
the price of legal services (Webb at 64). As Woolley says, the aim of this regulation, “should 
seek to prevent lawyers from unethical hourly billing, and to protect the public from paying 
the cost of these abuses” (Woolley at 885). This can only be achieved via regulation, not 
reliance on the market as the asymmetry of information between lawyer and client – a problem 
that is in inherent in the market for law as a commodity – means the market cannot prevent 
unethical billing, it must be done by regulation (Woolley at 888). This is a significant topic in 
itself and requires a review of New Zealand’s current practices to identify areas for possible 
reform. 
  
Lowering prices by indirect changes 
The changes discussed so far go directly to who can offer legal services and how pricing is set 
and monitored. There are other changes that are discussed in the literature which could 
indirectly affect pricing and for completeness, I outline them here.    
 
Create “practice ready” graduates 
The idea of creating “practice ready” graduates is that graduates would not need to be in firms 
where they receive training from experienced lawyers on the job, they would be prepared for 
independent practice and could therefore set up in competition to established firms. Some 
commentators encourage this approach and suggest it will help both the students secure jobs 
and increase access to legal services (Daniel Thies "Rethinking Legal Education in Hard 
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Times: The Recession, Practical Legal Education, and the New Job Market" (2009) 59 Journal 
of Legal Education 598). It is likely to be pressed by firms and other practitioners alike as 
clients become increasingly less willing to pay for junior staff who are essentially training at 
their expense (Joe Palazzolo “First-Year Associates: Are They Worth It?” (17 October 2011) 
Wall Street Journal). Condlin characterises “the ‘practice ready’ proposal” as “more slogan 
than idea” suggesting it misses the fundamental point of legal education, fails to recognise there 
are many different types of practice, and does not acknowledge that becoming proficient at any 
of the tasks required in a particular practice takes many repetitions which is not possible in a 
law school semester (Robert Condlin "Practice Ready Graduates: A Millennialist Fantasy" 
(2014) 31 Touro Law Review 75). There are disincentives for law schools to go down the path 
of providing more professional education as it does not generate prestige and there are 
regulatory problems to be overcome, with the control of legal education largely residing outside 
the individual law school (Hillman at 309). While the idea of a “practice ready graduate” may 
be unrealistic, law schools could upskill graduates to make the transition to more 
entrepreneurial practice earlier in their careers, for example by teaching fundamentals about 
running a business and about the legal services market. 
 
Teach law students about ethical billing 
A smaller but potentially useful proposal is that law schools spend more time training future 
lawyers about ethical billing: “It is only in law school that students can be given some relatively 
disinterested advice about the ethical pitfalls which legal practice can present and, in particular, 
about the ethical pressure which hourly billing exerts” (Woolley at 891). Training students 
about billing may prepare them to maintain an ethical practice once they are in a firm and avoid 
perpetuating a culture of high prices. It is already a requirement that students complete a course 
in legal ethics to be admitted to practice, so including this training would not be particularly 
difficult.  
 
Changes to civil procedure 
The more steps that are required to resolve a matter, the total cost of resolving the matter 
increases. Reducing the number of steps in a proceeding therefore will reduce the overall cost 
of the dispute and therefore the price that the client is charged. Rationing the amount of 
procedure any case can have (limiting steps in the proceeding) (Adrian Zuckerman "A Reform 
of Civil Procedure - Rationing Procedure rather than Access to Justice" (1995) 22 Journal of 
 13 
Law and Society 155) or excluding lawyers from the forum (New Zealand has followed this 
approach in many of its tribunals as well as in aspects of the Family Court. Cf Adrian 
Zuckerman "No Justice Without Lawyers: The Myth of an Inquisitorial System" (2014) 33 
Civil Justice Quarterly 355; Rabeea Assy Injustice in Person: The Right to Self-Representation 
(OUP, Oxford, 2015)), are sometimes suggested as ways of limiting the cost and therefore 
ensuring greater access. For example, a motivation for the formation of the Disputes Tribunal 
and the exclusion of lawyers from that forum, was “a desire to return to the supposed ideal 
state of nature, where reasonable and self-reliant men settled their differences without 
intervention of legal professionals, arcane rules of law, or unnaturally complex procedure” 
(Peter Spiller The Disputes Tribunals of New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2003) at 
3). This does not go to the price of those services as such, but limits the amount of lawyer-time 
that can be spent on a case, therefore reducing the price of litigation to the client. This is an 
area of reform that already receives attention in New Zealand, for example through the Rules 
Committee, and is an important accompaniment to looking at pricing reform.  
 
Diversify legal service delivery models 
Some commentators advocate regulatory reform to encourage alternative methods of service 
delivery, such as unbundling for litigious matters (Julie Macfarlane Identifying and Meeting 
the Needs of Self-Represented Litigants: Final Report (May 2013); Bridgette Toy-Cronin "Just 
an hour of your time? Providing limited (unbundled) assistance to litigants in person" (24 
March 2016) 884 LawTalk 20). Unbundling allows those with limited means to purchase some 
litigation assistance rather than the current situation where there is a one-size fits all model 
which puts litigants in the all or nothing position: “if they can afford the traditional mode of 
delivery, they get assistance; if they cannot afford the traditional mode of delivery, they get 
nothing” (Hadfield (2014) at 54). Again, this does not necessarily lower the price per hour of 
services but can lower the overall cost of litigation for the litigant as they can employ a lawyer’s 
help only as needed. 
 
Online legal services are seen as a major disruption to the traditional firm model: “[F]ostering 
online legal technology might benefit consumers by improving access to justice and encourage 
competition and innovation” (Lauren Moxley "Zooming Past the Monopoly: A Consumer 
Rights Approach to Reforming the Lawyer's Monopoly and Improving Access to Justice 
Student Note" (2015) 9 Harvard Law & Policy Review 553 at 555). While there is good 
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evidence that document assembly products are creating competition for lower priced services, 
it is less clear that online service delivery will have a major impact on litigation services. 
Technology has the potential to lower the cost of producing legal services and therefore 
enabling – but by no means guaranteeing – the savings to be passed on to the client.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has offered no silver bullet to the problems that continue to plague access to civil 
justice in New Zealand. Its purpose is to show that there are many other potential points for 
reform that stretch beyond the calls for more legal aid or more pro bono and look towards 
making the private market accessible to those who it is meant to serve. This includes looking 
at who can offer legal services and how pricing is set and monitored, points that are much less 
frequently discussed in access to justice conversations. Lower prices may also be supported 
through indirect change including to legal education, court procedure, and changes to the 
delivery of legal services. These points of reform – including more pro bono and more legal 
aid – together offer the potential for putting civil dispute resolution advice and representation 
into the hands of all New Zealanders. There is much work to be done but thinking more broadly 
and creatively about reform will be part of the answer.  
 
 
 
